Sovereign debt crisis in Greece: A system dynamics approach to policy analysis by Shao, Wei
 Sovereign Debt Crisis in Greece 
A System Dynamics Approach to Policy Analysis 
Wei Shao 
 
  I 
 
 
 
Sovereign Debt Crisis in Greece: 
 
A System Dynamics Approach to 
Policy Analysis 
 
Wei Shao 
 
 
 
Supervised by 
 Dr. I. David Wheat 
Associate Professor of System Dynamics 
University of Bergen 
Norway 
 
  
  II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Melissa, 
who is inspiring. 
相濡以沫...... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  III 
Abstract 
 
Although the budget deficit modification by new elected government and 
following government bonds downgrading by world rating agencies directly triggered 
the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, the most substantial cause is its prodigal and 
extravagant fiscal policy. Greece has enjoyed “living beyond its salary” life since it 
became member of Eurozone in 2001, because it can borrow heavily from 
international markets especially from member countries to fund its huge budget 
deficit. Greece requested financial support formally and formulated fiscal austerity 
and structural reform for exchanging 110 billion Euros bailout from both Europe and 
IMF. This paper reproduced the history of this issue using System Dynamics model in 
which the government debt is the most important researching object. System 
Dynamics as the most powerful problem-replication tool is also used in the paper to 
analyze those fiscal consolidation policies putting in a relative long-term period, 
which could help the official policymakers to formulate effective policies for the sake 
of making the government debt sustainable. 
 
Keywords: sovereign debt crisis, budget deficit, government revenue, government 
expenditure, pension system, healthcare system, civil servants system, system 
dynamics 
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1. Introduction 
 
Historically, financial crises have been followed by the fears of governments 
defaulting on their debt obligations. Financial crises tend to lead to, or exacerbate, 
sharp economic downturns, low government revenues, widening government deficits, 
and high levels of debt, pushing many governments into the edge of default. The 
burden of public debt will become even larger in the next few years given the current 
financial crisis where governments around the world spend billions of euros in order 
to stabilize the financial system (Greiner, 2011). As global economy is still surviving 
in the recovery from financial crisis that started in fall 2008, Greece’s sovereign debt 
crisis brought a second wave of the crisis which held EU back from recovery, 
especially the Eurozone. 
 
During the decade preceding the global financial crisis, Greek government 
borrowed heavily from abroad to fund substantial government budget deficits. 
Between 2001, when Greece adopted the euro as its currency, and 2008, Greece’s 
reported budget deficits averaged 5% per year, compared to a Eurozone average of 
2%. In the past 6 years, government expenditure grew at a high rate of 87% compared 
with a relatively low rate of 31% at which its revenues grew. Moreover, in 2009, 
public expenditure reached 50% of GDP. 
 
Greece had a chronically high external debt of €298 billion in 2009, 126.8% of 
GDP, and the budget deficit was 15.4% of GDP. Both Greece’s budget deficit and 
external debt level are well above those permitted by the rules governing the EU’s 
Economic and Monetary Union. Specifically, the euro convergence criteria (also 
known as the Maastricht Treaty) calls for budget deficit ceilings of 3% of GDP and 
external debt ceilings of 60% of GDP. Greece is not alone, however, in exceeding 
these limits. Of the 27 EU member states, 20 currently exceed the deficit ceiling set 
out in the Maastricht Treaty, especially Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain (PIGS). 
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 show both general government debt and budget deficit as a 
percentage of GDP of PIGS countries. 
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Figure 1.1: General Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Budget Deficit as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Greece’s reliance on external financing for funding budget deficits left its 
economy highly vulnerable to shifts in investor confidence. Since late 2009, investor 
confidence in the Greek government has been rattled. In October 2009, the new 
socialist government, led by Prime Minister George Papandreou, revised the estimate 
of the government budget deficit for 2009, nearly doubling the existing estimate of 
6.7% of GDP to 12.7% of GDP. This was shortly followed by rating downgrades of 
Greek bonds by the three major credit rating agencies. Countries with large external 
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debts, like Greece, were of particular concern for investors. Allegations that Greek 
governments had falsified statistics and attempted to obscure debt levels through 
complex financial instruments offered by Goldman Sachs also contributed to a drop in 
investor confidence. 
 
Investor jitteriness spiked again in 2010, when Eurostat released its estimate of 
Greece’s budget deficit. At 15.4% of GDP (Figure 1.2), Eurostat’s estimate was 
almost 3 full percentages higher than the previous estimate released by the Greek 
government in October 2009. This led to renewed questions about Greece’s ability to 
repay its debts, with €8.5 billion ($11.1 billion) falling due in mid-May 2010. The 
main incentive for repaying sovereign debt is to maintain access to international 
capital markets (Alichi, 2008). On April 23, 2010, the Greek government formally 
requested financial assistance from the IMF and other Eurozone countries. The 
European Commission, backed by Germany, requested that the details of Greece’s 
budget cuts for 2010, 2011, and 2012 be released before providing the financial 
assistance. In late April 2010, the spread between Greek and German 10-year bonds 
reached a record high of 650 basis points, and one of the major credit rating agencies, 
Moody’s, downgraded Greece’s bond rating. 
 
Greece’s current economic problems have been caused by a mix of domestic and 
international factors. Domestically, high government spending, structural rigidities, 
tax evasion, and corruption have all contributed to Greece’s accumulation of debt 
over the past decade. At the beginning of that Euro was adopted as the common 
currency for the monetary union, several disciplines are regulated to limit deficit. The 
central bank is strictly forbidden to finance budget deficits, i.e. it is not allowed to 
operate on the primary debt market. In order to ensure that it will abide by these legal 
requirements, it has been made strongly independent from governments. Finally, a no 
bailout clause fully shields governments and all official institutions (including the 
Eurosystem and the Commission) from any one authority’s liabilities. These are 
strong and highly credible safeguards(Wyplosz, 2006). The conditions of the Stability 
and Growth Pact have not been enforced very strictly. Indeed, during the first 
economic slowdown at the beginning of the 2000s, France and Germany set a poor 
standard by transgressing the limits the Pact set to public debt and budget deficit. The 
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Commission in the end did not impose sanctions(MAMADOUH and WUSTEN, 
2010). So, internationally, the adoption of the euro and lax enforcement of EU rules 
aimed at limiting the accumulation of debt are also believed to have contributed to 
Greece’s current crisis. As a result, Greece was able to borrow funds at low interest 
rates normally available only to more creditworthy countries. 
 
The Greek economic structure depends too much on tourism and international 
shipping, both of which are easily influenced by financial crisis very much and they 
are really depressed by the financial crisis from 2008. Government revenue from 
these two sectors was cut down. Besides, tax evasion is very popular all over the 
country. “Countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece have had continuous democracies 
only since the 1970s, and people aren't used to governments representing the public 
interest.” “In most of these countries, what matters is your family. … There is less of 
a sense of duty towards the state,” said Alberto Alesina, a professor of political 
economy at Harvard University, “Evading taxes is something you can freely talk 
about – and be proud of – at a dinner party in these countries.” The situation is 
definitely like snow plus frost to the pitiful government revenue, eventually increasing 
the budget deficit. 
 
Besides weak government revenue, there are many heavy government 
expenditures. The civil servants have high wages and excellent pensions. The wages 
of civil servants have a 6% annual growth rate, doubling the average in Eurozone. 
Nevertheless, the government sectors are overstaffing with poor productivity. They 
can get 14 months’ wages a year and subsidies up to €1300 for reasons of using 
computer, speaking foreign language, or getting to work on time. 
 
Civil servants in Greece employed before 1992 can retire after 35 years service, if 
they have reached 58, and retire on 80% of their final basic salary. It is more startling 
that the government has been paying dead people. The Greek government pays 500 
pensioners over the age of 110. Apparently, 300 of them have already passed away. 
Besides this recent discovery, the Greek government may be guilty other wasteful 
compensation practices. For example, it pays pensions to unmarried or divorced 
daughters of deceased civil servants. In some cases, it also pays government workers 
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bonuses for speaking foreign languages, using a computer, arriving to work on time 
and working outdoors, according to Thomson Reuters. That certainly sounds a great 
deal more generous than similar civil service schemes in Germany, which seem to 
insist on 40 years of service, and set the pensions rates in the low 70% range of final 
basic salaries. It is not just that German politicians and newspaper commentators are 
really cross about the idea of bailing out the profligate Greek government. It is 
striking how often their annoyance is expressed in angry comparisons of the Greek 
and German retirement pension rules. Even the news that the Greek government was 
planning to raise the legal retirement age from 61 to 63 as part of swinging austerity 
measures seems to have been like a red rag to a bull in Germany, which not long ago 
increased its legal age from 65 to 67. “The Greeks go onto the streets to protest 
against the increase of the pension age from 61 to 63. Does that mean that the 
Germans should in future extend the working age from 67 to 69, so that the Greeks 
can enjoy their retirement?” 
 
Healthcare is a large industry sector in developed countries, with total health 
expenditure accounting for around 9% of GDP, ranking top among OECD countries. 
The Ministry of Health and Welfare is the leading institution in developing and 
financing health policies. The “healthcare system” of a nation comprises those 
activities that aim to improve the health of the population, either by providing 
personal services to the individual or non-personal interventions to groups of the 
population. The World Health Organization (WHO) broadly defines health as “a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity”. Therefore, in addition to the healthcare system, many other 
areas of human and social activity contribute indirectly to the health and wellbeing of 
the nation, including education as well as environmental and social infrastructure. 
Many Greeks have been calling for reform to their country’s healthcare system. 
Despite this, it was ranked by the World Health Organization as one of the best in the 
world; with average healthcare costs among the lowest of the European Union 
member countries. Currently, there are moves from the government to upgrade the 
healthcare system, having obtained funding assistance from the European Union. 
Such improvements include the building of new facilities, developing mobile medical 
units, improving accident and emergency facilities and the installation of high-tech 
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medical equipment. The public health system in Greece provides free, or low cost, 
healthcare services to residents (and their families) contributing to the social security 
system. Other benefits include free laboratory services, maternity care, medical-
related appliances or devices and transportation. Other European Union nationals can 
also avail of free healthcare benefits provided they have their E111 forms. Emergency 
care is provided free of charge in public hospitals to anyone, regardless of nationality. 
There are also smaller outpatient clinics in rural areas which are attached to bigger 
public hospitals. These facilities provide faster emergency treatment than the bigger 
public hospitals. Medications are of good quality and the pharmacists are highly 
trained. Medicines are also highly subsidized with only 25% of the cost of the 
prescription being charged. The insurance funds (IKA, OGA, TEVE, and others) have 
been under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance since 
September 1995. They play a significant role in the provision and financing of 
ambulatory services. IKA, the largest social insurance fund (50% of the population) 
covering mainly blue- and white-collar workers, is responsible for the financing and 
provision of health care services through its wide and decentralized network of 
primary health care facilities (over 200 urban polyclinics and clinics). OGA, the 
second largest social insurance fund, covers farmers and their families (25% of the 
population) who use the NHS services (i.e. rural health centres). The rest of the funds 
provide health care services to their beneficiaries mainly through contracts with 
private physicians for the ambulatory sector, and public or private hospitals for 
secondary and tertiary health care services. Secondary and tertiary care is provided by 
NHS hospitals which are publicly owned and financed mainly by the state budget as 
well as by the insurance funds. Apart from the Ministry of Health and the social 
insurance funds, the private sector plays a significant role in health care 
provision(WHO, 1996). 
 
In an effort to restore investor confidence in the Greek economy, the Papandreou 
government has pursued a series of wide-ranging fiscal austerity measures. However, 
the combination of spending cuts and tax increases do not appear to have appeased 
investors enough to enable Greece to raise the money it needs to cover its maturing 
debt payments. On 2 May 2010, a loan agreement was reached between Greece, the 
other Eurozone countries, and the IMF. The deal consists of an immediate €45 billion 
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in low interest loans to be provided in 2010, with more funds available later. A total 
of €110 billion has been agreed in order to avoid defaulting on its debt obligations. 
Although European leaders and the IMF have welcomed the austerity measures taken 
by the Greek government thus far, they are expected to request additional measures 
and further details on plans to meet budget deficit targets in exchange for financial 
assistance. 
 
In order to get the bailout package and maybe more in the future, the Greek 
government has approved a new Stability and Growth Program in January 2010, 
which including a bunch of policies and reforms in government revenue and 
expenditures. Besides making the model to replicate what the problem is, I also 
analyze the policies in the new Stability and Growth Program to see their effects on 
the government debt both in medium-term and long-term period. 
 
The whole paper will be organized chapter by chapter. The introduction to the 
debt crisis is in chapter 1; chapter 2 includes the dynamic problem and reference 
mode followed by chapter 3 which lists the literatures review; chapter 4 shows causal 
loop and stock & flow diagrams of the model; validations of the model comprises 
chapter 5 and policy analysis comes up in chapter 6; the final chapter 7 includes 
conclusion and recommendations to the Greek debt crisis. 
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2. Dynamic Problem 
 
Since Greece adopted Euro as its national currency in 2001, there has been budget 
deficit for 9 years (Figure 2.1), meaning that government spending exceeded its 
revenue in every fiscal year. At the end of 2009, the budget deficit got to 15.4% of 
GDP. So the Greek government had to borrow more heavily from international 
market. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Greek Budget Deficit as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Moreover, joining the Eurozone, Greece can easily get loans from banks in 
Eurozone at low interest rate to finance state budget and service existing debt. Due to 
budget deficit, government debt increased exponentially and accumulated to €298 
billion till end of 2009, 126.8% of GDP (Figure 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2: Greek General Government Debt 
 
In the Stability and Growth Pact, Member States of the EMU committed 
themselves to strict financial rules: a maximum public debt of 60 per cent of the GDP 
and a maximum budget deficit of 3 per cent (the Maastricht Treaty that regulated 
access to the euro contained the same thresholds). The European Commission was 
made responsible for the oversight of the implementation of the Pact and should make 
sure that a Member State that did not comply with these rules got back to the ‘normal’ 
situation as soon as possible through budget cuts, improvements of its trade balance or 
the refinancing of its debt with private bankers. No financial help could be expected 
from the European Central Bank which is required to protect the euro against the 
policies of the Member States. 
 
From both Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, we can see that the Greek government 
neither obeys the budget deficit nor public debt rules. And the conditions of the 
Stability and Growth Pact have not been enforced very strictly. Indeed, during the 
first economic slowdown at the beginning of the 2000s, France and Germany set a 
poor standard by transgressing the limits the Pact set to public debt and budget deficit. 
The Commission in the end did not impose sanctions. That did not help the serious 
application of these norms (MAMADOUH and WUSTEN, 2010). 
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There is widespread consensus that poor debt management can have a 
destabilizing impact on the government budget through the unexpected increase in 
debt servicing costs (Velandia, 2002). The reliance on funding budget deficit from 
international capital markets left Greece highly vulnerable to shifts in investor 
confidence. Investors became jittery in October 2009, when the newly elected Greek 
government revised the estimate of the government budget deficit for 2009 from 6.7% 
of gross domestic product (GDP) to 12.7% of GDP. In 2010, Eurostat, the European 
Union (EU)’s statistical agency, estimated Greece’s deficit to be even higher, at 
15.4% of GDP. Investors have become increasingly nervous about Greece’s ability to 
repay its maturing debt obligations, estimated at €54 billion ($72.1 billion) for 2010. 
Euro also depreciated along with the debt crisis. From a view of export, though, Euro 
depreciation fulfilled the interests of Germany and France, it harmed the economic 
stability of Eurozone and the European integration process. The Greek debt crisis has 
evolved into European debt crisis and this frustrated the confidence of international 
investors who withdrew capital from the dangerous zone. The European Commission 
as the EU’s executive body who represents and upholds the interests of Europe as a 
whole cannot turn a blind eye on it. The EC is calling for strong policies from Greek 
government to manage its budget deficit as well as maintain EU economy grow 
stably. 
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3. Literature Review 
 
Since the debt crisis emerged, there are lots of academicians and institutions 
researching on similar topic. Relative literature will be reviewed under the following 
categories: 
 
3.1. What is Happening in Greece 
 
Several researchers explained what is happening in Greece. Nelson and other 
2 researchers (2010) in European Affairs gave the introduction to Greece’s debt 
crisis. They gave the background and analyzed possible causes of the crisis. They 
expounded and proved that high government spending and weak government 
revenues contributed to Greece’s budget deficits. That Greek industry is suffering 
from declining international competitiveness is another causes domestically. 
Internationally, Greece’s adoption of the euro as its national currency in 2001 is 
seen by some as a contributing factor in Greece’s buildup of debt. The lack of 
enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact is also seen as a contributing factor 
to Greece’s high level of debt (Nelson et al., 2010). 
 
Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) used insights from the literature on currency 
crises to offer an analytical treatment of the crisis unfolding in the market for 
Greek government bonds. They conclude that the crisis and its escalating nature 
are the result of (a) steadily deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals over the 
period 2001-2009 to levels inconsistent with long-term EMU participation; and 
(b) a double shift in markets’ expectations, from a regime of credible commitment 
to future EMU participation under an implicit EMU/German guarantee of Greek 
fiscal liabilities, to a regime of non-credible EMU commitment without fiscal 
guarantees, respectively taking place in November 2009 and February/March 
2010. Following this shift, resorting to the EU/IMF mechanism of emergency 
financing on 23 April 2010 was the only option available for Greece to avert an 
imminent EMU-exit. There is now a clear binary path regarding the outcome of 
the Greek debt crisis. Either Greece will introduce the reforms necessary to 
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address the crisis’ initial source, i.e. deteriorating fundamentals, in which case 
and, assuming a favorable external environment, her economy will gradually 
regain the markets’ confidence and the country will stay in the EMU; or Greece 
will not promote any reforms, in which case she will have no option other than to 
leave the euro (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2010). 
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3.2. Influences 
 
After Greek debt crisis emerged, researchers also had expressed influences to 
Greece and other countries. Das said ASEAN (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia) is undergoing its own regional economic integration process. ASEAN 
leaders are aiming to establish an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. 
However, it has its own challenges and one of them is the issue of the 
development divide, especially since the admission of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar 
and Vietnam. ASEAN must be able to narrow the divide at least partially by 2015 
because with economic integration the member countries would be more 
dependent on each other in terms of export and investment, securities and property 
markets, and even consumer and investor confidence. This implies that any 
disturbance or problem of one country can eventually lead to disruption in 
another. Thus, in an increasingly integrated region the policy planning must take 
into account the issues of the weaker members so that a situation similar to EU 
does not occur in ASEAN (Das, 2010). 
 
Nelson (2010) afraid that there is a risk of contagion to other Southern 
European countries, including Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain, which, along 
with Greece, have been nicknamed the “PIGS”. Like Greece, these countries 
borrowed heavily during the credit bubble before the current global financial crisis 
and have encountered investors who are increasingly nervous about the 
sustainability of their debt. They also discuss the influence on European 
integration: How imbalances will be resolved within the Eurozone may be an 
important component of debates about EU integration in the future.  
 
In addition, Greece’s debt crisis could have major implications for the United 
States. A weaker euro would likely lower U.S. exports to the Eurozone and 
increase U.S. imports from the Eurozone, widening the U.S. trade deficit; 
Widespread financial instability in the EU could impact trade and growth in the 
region, which in turn could impact the U.S. economy; a Greek default could have 
implications for U.S. commercial interests. 
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3.3. Policy Proposals 
 
Policies to this debt crisis are also discussed. Fiscal consolidation and 
austerity policies are mentioned in nearly every research. A paper from Oxford 
Economics mainly talked about the defaulting or exiting from Eurozone and 
devaluation or combinations of policies above. Greece could repudiate or more 
likely seek to restructure its public debt while remaining a Eurozone member. In 
principle there is no barrier to this, but the consequences would be severe in terms 
of financial contagion within the Eurozone and in the wider world. Greece would 
leave the Eurozone and engineer a substantial devaluation of a newly issued 
national currency. This would have the impact of improving competitiveness and 
boosting growth and government revenues. It would also leave Greece able to 
finance the budget by monetary means. But if Greece’s debt remained in euros, 
then Greece’s debt ratios would worsen significantly and the risk of default could 
increase. And if Greece attempted to redenominate its debt into a new national 
currency (to allow it to be inflated away) this would be considered a legal default. 
Default reduces the debt interest component of Greece’s deficit, and exiting the 
Eurozone and devaluing allows monetary financing of the deficit and an 
improvement of the external balance. But the financial contagion effects would be 
very large and unpredictable both on Greece, its neighbors, and the rest of the 
world, and the political costs to Greece enormous. 
 
But few of them discuss and analyze the policies – especially the most 
“feasible” ones – deeply over a relative long-term period. Will the policy 
recommendations work well or not? What are the influences on the economy of 
Greece in the future? How can the policies combine with each other to yield a 
better result? These are the main questions need to be answered in this paper using 
System Dynamics approach. 
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4. Dynamic Hypothesis 
4.1. Hypothesis Overview 
 
“Debt is that which is owed.” “In the case of assets, debt is a means of using 
future purchasing power in the present before a summation has been earned.” A 
debt is created when a creditor agrees to lend a sum of assets to a debtor. In 
modern society, debt is usually granted with expected repayment, and in most 
cases, plus interest. Speaking from a stock & flow perspective, for a country, debt, 
which is a stock, is increased by the government borrowing which is the inflow, 
and less by repayment that is the outflow and net government borrowing is budget 
deficit; while from a causal loop diagram view, the more the budget deficit, the 
lager the debt, then the more the interest and in return the more the budget deficit. 
Figure 4.1 presents the reinforcing loop drives debt into an exponential growth 
pattern. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Simple Causal Loop Diagram of Government Debt 
 
A budget deficit occurs when an entity spends more money than it takes in. 
The gap between government expenditure and government revenue contributes to 
budget deficit. Greece, as one of the most generous country in Europe, has 
implemented inappropriate fiscal policy-expansive government expenditure and 
weak government revenue for decade. Meanwhile, the preceding governments had 
budget
deficit governmentdebt
interest
payments
+
+
+ R
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absence of the willing to maintain fiscal discipline and the membership of 
Eurozone made Greece easy to finance itself through low interest loans, which all 
push the country onto the present position. 
 
In the following sections, I will discuss the finance of main structure of 
government expenditure and revenue. They are population, civil servants system, 
pension system, healthcare system and taxation system, all these modules will be 
integrated into government debt module, which displays the whole picture of 
relationships among the modules above. 
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4.2. Casual Loop Diagram 
4.2.1. Population Module 
 
Population for a country is the fundamental element to develop. It’s the 
wellhead of productive power while it’s also the source of public expenditure. 
Figure 4.2 displays the causal loop diagram of Population module. The 
reinforcing loop R is marked with red lines and counteracting loops C1~C5 
with blue lines. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Causal Loop Diagram of Population Module 
 
The total population is composed of young, workage and elderage 
population that are in the aging chain. Workage population constitutes the 
potential labor force of the country and also includes women in fertile age. 
The more the workage population, the more the women in fertile age would 
be. Under condition of the same total fertility rate, there would be more birth, 
then more young population and more workage population. They could be also 
contributed by total fertility rate that is the average number of children that 
would be born to a woman over her lifetime. Counteracting loops C1~C3 are 
because of death of each population cohort. Life expectancy can influence the 
duration of elderage population. The increasing in life expectancy will 
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accumulate more elderage population. Net migration into each population 
cohort is another factor affecting these cohorts. 
 
4.2.2. Taxation System Module 
 
The government revenue is mainly from income tax and social 
contribution. In Greece, companies resident in Greece are subject to corporate 
income tax on their worldwide income and capital gains. Non-resident 
companies that have a permanent establishment in Greece are subject to 
corporate income tax on income and capital gains derived through the 
permanent establishment. An employer is obligated to deduct tax at source 
from an employee and to make additional contributions to social security as in 
many other EU member states. The causal loop diagram of Greek government 
revenue is shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Causal Loop Diagram of Taxation System Module 
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Normally, nominal GDP could be divided into corporate profits and 
nominal wages of employees, which is measured by labor share. Labor’s share 
of GDP is the nominal wages of employees. The more the labor share, the 
more the nominal wages are, comparing to corporate profits. Nominal wages 
will increase along with the increasing in nominal GDP, and so as corporate 
profits, on condition that labor share is a constant. Government revenue is 
mainly composed of personal income tax, corporation tax and both personal 
and corporation social contribution based on nominal wages of employees. 
The government formulates the tax rates for a period. On employment side, 
labor force is the base. Under the same productivity, employment is 
proportional of labor force. Nominal wages per worker are then decided by 
nominal wages and employment. 
 
Black economy, also known as shadow economy or underground 
economy, which has no contribution to government revenue, accounts a lot of 
economic activities in Greece. It is the segment of a country's economic 
activity that is derived from sources that fall outside of the country’s rules and 
regulations regarding commerce. The activities can be either legal or illegal 
depending on what goods and/or services are involved. Basically, the amount 
of black economy is positive relative with the legal part – nominal GDP. The 
higher the tax rate, the more people would like to participate into black 
economy in order to hold effective tax evasion or tax avoidance to achieve 
maximum profits. Aggressive tax avoidance in terms of transfer pricing 
practices and formation of offshore companies has flourished in recent years, 
and the current tax reforms have taken into account such methods of tax 
avoidance (Skouloudis et al., 2011). 
 
4.2.3. Pension System Module 
 
Pensions are provided through an earnings-related public scheme with 
two components plus a series of minimum pensions/social safety nets. The 
earnings measure is the average over the last five years before retirement. 
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Figure 4.4: Causal Loop Diagram of Pension System Module 
 
Figure 4.4 displays the causal loop diagram of pension system relating 
with taxation system and population. The governmental pension expenditure 
depends on the pension base (average wages of the last 5 years before 
retirement), pension population and replacement rate. 
 
The pension base is positive relative to nominal wages per worker, the 
growth of nominal wages results in the growth of pension base. Not all 
elderage population can have the pension because some don’t meet the 
requirement of pension plan such as people supported by their family or living 
off their property or investment and so on. Farmers are also excluded from 
pension population in the model for the reason that the farmers are subject to 
another pension plan different with the one applied to urban workers. Pension 
population is the population that can get the pension. More elderage 
population means more pension population. Recently, more people become 
elderage population and life expectancy is growing, which results in rapid 
growing in elderage population and so as pensioners. 
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Furthermore, the government would not pay the pension the same 
amount with average wages before retirement. Hence replacement rate is a 
useful tool to calculate the pension. Replacement rate is the percentage of a 
worker's pre-retirement income that is paid out by a pension program upon 
retirement. In some cases, workers can use replacement rates to help estimate 
what their retirement income might be from the plan. 
 
4.2.4. Healthcare System Module 
 
The finance of healthcare system in Greece is both from public and 
private sector. Healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP reveals how much 
the country spends on healthcare. Total healthcare spending is the total 
national spending on healthcare by both public and private. Public healthcare 
expenditure is derived from total healthcare spending by public source 
percentage. Figure 4.5 shows the causal diagram of the finance of healthcare 
system. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Causal Diagram of Healthcare System Module 
 
There are two exogenous variables in the diagram. They are healthcare 
spending as a percentage of GDP and public source percentage. The two 
variables are relatively stable during the simulation period. Hence, public 
healthcare expenditure increases if nominal GDP increased.  
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4.2.5. Civil Servants System Module 
 
A civil servant or public servant is a public sector employee working 
for a government department or agency other than military. Same with pension 
system, the finance of civil servants system is decided by civil servants 
population and average wages of civil servants – pc civil servants wages. 
Figure 4.6 gives the causal loop diagram of civil servants system. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Causal Loop Diagram of Civil Servants System Module 
 
Different from pension population, known as pensioners, civil servants 
population is controllable. Government could control the civil servants 
population through recruiting, freezing or cutting those positions. From Figure 
4.6, the civil servants population is driven by two reinforcing loops R2 & R3 
and two counteracting loops C1 & C2. During the simulation period, 
government tried to maintain the civil servants population, which is the result 
driven by those two kinds of loops, though it’s rather redundant and low 
productive. 
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Civil servants wages is also derived from nominal wages per worker. 
And civil servants wages is growing with a stable high growth rate that is 
bigger than nominal wages growth rate. So, that civil servants wages grows at 
a higher rate compared with normal workers. Furthermore, the civil servants 
have various kinds of subsidies for speaking foreign languages, using a 
computer or getting to work on time. 
 
Then annual civil servants payroll is the product of pc civil servants 
wages, pc civil servants subsidy and civil servants population. 
 
4.2.6. Government Debt 
 
All modules talked above eventually will be integrated into a top-level 
model of the government debt whose causal loop diagram is shown in Figure 
4.7. Wheat (2007) gave a government debt sub-model in his MacroLab, which 
is adapted to my model. The government revenue and government expenditure 
from where the green arrows link are all displayed as exogenous in the 
diagram, which have been talked in above modules. The emphasis of this 
model is on government borrowing, government debt, debt repayments and 
interest payments. Figure 4.1 has shown a simple relationship among these 
elements. Without doubt, it’s far more complex in the real world but it’ll be 
simplified with three reinforcing loops R1, R2, R3 and one counteracting loop 
C1. 
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Figure 4.7: Causal Loop Diagram of Government Debt 
 
Beginning with government borrowing, as its name, government 
borrowing is the gap between revenue and expenditure of the government. The 
more the government expenditure and the less the government revenue, the 
more the government borrowing will be. On the other side, debt repayments is 
the principle the government need pay to the creditor when the debt is due. 
Both of the two flows influence the government debt directly. And the 
difference between government borrowing and debt repayments is budget 
deficit. In each single year, debt repayments has no influence on budget deficit 
and government debt (C1 counteracts R3 perfectly), but it does in next years. 
Because the government finances its debt through borrowing new debt to 
repay the old one, but the quantity of borrowing will influence the interest 
payments, then government debt. 
 
More government debt implies higher cost of borrowing new debt, 
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adding up to interest payments of old debt constitutes the total interest 
payment of each single year. It will be reduced by interest paid off – When an 
amount of debt is due, the government has to pay the last amount of interest 
and the principle to the creditor, meaning that this amount of debt has been 
paid off, its interest for a single year needs not to be paid any more. The 
interest payments go into government expenditure eventually, which will in 
turn lift the budget deficit. This is how R1 works. 
 
Besides, government borrowing could lead the new interest to a higher 
level directly through R2. Once the new borrowing occurred, the interest (new 
interest) to be paid for the new borrowing is decided. These two reinforcing 
loops could drive government debt to a dramatically high level. 
 
The problem is that there are no feedbacks into the government 
revenue and expenditure branches such as pension payment, healthcare 
payment and civil servants payroll. The government spent according to the 
demand – how much the government need to pay, but didn’t consider the 
supply – how much the government need to earn. The unwillingness to make 
change and long time cumulated debt results in the debt crisis, that the Greek 
government cannot repay mature debt through issuing new government bond 
because investors lost confidence in Greek bond market. 
 
  
  26 
4.3. Major Model Assumptions and Boundaries 
 
Any models cannot replicate the real world completely, but they can still 
represent the real world by condensed and more understandable structures. All of 
these give the credit to reasonable model assumptions and clear model boundaries. 
 
Major Model Assumptions: 
1. Men and women are treated the same, they will all retire when 65 years 
old. And after 65 years old, nobody can be employed. Besides, all the 
citizens in Greece what ever male or female will share the same rights and 
responsibilities; 
2. The recruitment of civil servants is well planned; 
3. The pensions delivered to dead people are excluded, because the quantity 
is relative low compared with the whole pension payment; 
4. All government revenue is from taxation system; 
5. All government borrowing could be funded successfully by issuing 
government bonds; 
6. The government could fund its budget deficit successfully in each year, in 
other words, the government could borrow enough money to fill the gap 
between its expenditure and revenue; 
7. All bonds issued by the government are fixed interest rate bonds. The 
interest rate would not change before matured; 
8. The government pays annual interests to creditors and pays the principal 
and the last interest at the matured year. 
 
Major Model Boundaries: 
 
Not all ingredients related to one issue need to be endogenous. Some factors 
whose forming mechanisms are very complex could be treated exogenous because 
they beyond the study of the research. May some also be excluded from the 
model. 
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A boundary chart is displayed below. The main variables in the model are 
divided into three categories: endogenous, exogenous and excluded. Variables like 
nominal wages per worker and bond interest rates are decided by other variables, 
while variables such as GDP deflator and real GDP change rate are treated as 
exogenous because the generations of them have low relativeness to the model 
under study. Some are absolutely excluded like pensions paid to dead people. 
They have little influence on the simulation. 
 
 
 
  
 
Endogenous 
 
- nominal wages per 
worker 
- government 
revenue 
- Government Debt 
- Interest Payments 
- bond interest rate 
- debt expenditure 
Exogenous 
 
- real GDP change 
rate 
- employment rate 
- GDP deflator 
- labor share 
- death rates 
- life expectancy 
Excluded 
 
- pensions to dead  
- types of bonds 
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4.4. Stock & Flow Diagram 
 
The model is designed with modules, which gives a more organized and 
clearer view into the working mechanism. Modules are self-contained models that 
you can connect to other models. Modules allow you to break a single model into 
well-defined "chunks". Each module within a model is a cohesive model on its 
own, which you can run separately or within the larger model. 
 
By using modules, you can: 
 
 Build small, self-contained portions of a model, one-at-a-time. 
 Test a single portion of a large model. 
 Represent a hierarchical system in a model, by making each level of 
the hierarchy into a separate module, with each module linked to one 
or more levels above it. 
 Work with teams to build a complex model by having each team 
member build separate modules that are later linked together. 
 Reuse portions of a model in as many models as you want. 
 Create very large models (models that may have previously exceeded 
size limits). 
 Incorporate locked models into other models. 
 
You can create as many modules as you need, and you can incorporate as 
many modules as you want into a single model. This allows you to create very 
large or complex models that are broken down into cohesive, self-contained 
pieces. 
 
Furthermore, I also made some color-coding in order to differentiate the 
function of so many stocks, flows or variables. As we can see, blue represents the 
model elements that replicate the reference mode; purple is for policy model; 
green means module inputs from other modules in the model; red shows module 
outputs to other modules in the model or important indicators. Only selected 
equations are showed in this section, others are listed in Appendix. 
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 Population Module 4.4.1.
 
Population module is a classical aging chain. An aging chain can have 
any number of stocks (called cohorts), and each cohort can have any number 
of inflows or outflows. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Stock and Flow Diagram of Population 
 
Figure 4.8 displays the stock and flow diagram of Greek population. 
For the sake of studying effectively, the whole population is divided into 3 
stocks: youngage population, workage population and elerage population. 
Migration goes into each cohort and death goes out. Population leaves from 
one cohort to another depending on pre-set age duration. The women in fertile 
age decide the birth, equations as below: 
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 Taxation System Module 4.4.2.
 
Government revenue is mostly from taxation system. Tax income is 
derived from nominal GDP. Both individual employee and employer are 
responsible to pay tax to government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 displays the main index of economy including nominal 
GDP, nominal wages from labor share and corporate profits, also employment 
and nominal wages per worker which is the output to both pension and civil 
servants system. The calculation of nominal wages is: 
 
   =    ∗   ℎ 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Stock and Flow Diagram 1 of Taxation System 
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Black economy in Greece is estimated accounting for 25% of nominal 
GDP, but it is untaxed. How to move black economy back to legal market is 
what the government needs confront. 
 
The government collects tax through various kinds of tax, mainly from 
income tax and social contribution. Figure 4.10 shows the detail. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Stock and Flow Diagram 2 of Taxation System 
 
Annual tax income is the sum of personal taxes and corporate taxes. 
Personal tax rate is a weighted 24% and corporate tax rate is 24%. Employers 
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social contribution is the same – nominal wages, what different are only the 
social contribution rates. 
 
 Pension System Module 4.4.3.
 
Pensioners have 14 months’ pensions for each year. Normally, 
pensions will be delivered to pensioners monthly, so each pensioner can have 
12 months’ pensions every year. But Greek pensioners can enjoy 2 more 
months’ pensions, totally 14 months’ pensions. The pension base is the 
average of last 5 years wages before retirement. In order to sample the last 5 
years wages before retirement, a conveyor is introduced, transit time is 5 years 
(Figure 4.11), which means that the sum of last five years wages at the end of 
each simulation year is on the conveyor. Pension base is the sum divided by 
transit time – 5 years.  
 
 
Figure 4.11: Stock and Flow Diagram of Pension System 
 
For labor-market entrants from 1993, the pension is 2% of earnings for 
each year of contributions up to 35 years. There is therefore a maximum 
replacement rate of 70% for people retiring at the normal age or earlier. 
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However, for working after the age of 65 and a contribution period of 35 
years, there is a higher accrual of 3.3% per year, for a maximum of three 
years, while there is no accrual rate for those working after this period 
(maximum replacement rate of 80%). Then taking supplement pension into 
account, a replacement around 90% is used in the model. 
 
 Healthcare System Module 4.4.4.
 
Healthcare system is extremely complex than what we imagine. Total 
healthcare spending includes public expenditure and private payment. In order 
to know the finance of healthcare system, we can simplify the system as what 
Figure 4.12 shows.  
 
 
Figure 4.12: Stock and Flow Diagram of Healthcare System 
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Public healthcare expenditure is what government pays on healthcare, 
which contributes to government expenditure then budget deficit. 
 
 Civil Servants System Module 4.4.5.
 
The finance of civil servants system shares the same principle with 
pension system. We need know civil servants population and average wages of 
civil servants. Figure 4.13 shows how we formulate the two variables. 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Stock and Flow Diagram of Civil Servants System 
 
The civil servants have been redundant with low productivity, but with 
higher wages. Government tries to maintain the civil servants population, but 
there is a delay between retiring/death and recruiting.  
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Pc civil servants wages is higher than nominal wages per worker, and 
it grows steadily each year. In addition to wages, civil servants can get extra 
subsidies due to various reasons, such as using a computer, speaking foreign 
language, arriving on position on time and so on. They can also get 14 
months’ wages each year.  
 
 Government Debt 4.4.6.
 
Now we are getting to the top-level model. All modules are integrated 
into this model. Figure 4.14 offers a big picture for it. The five modules we 
talked above are shown on the low left, they coordinate with each other and 
produce the government revenue and expenditure. Only three main kinds of 
expenditures are considered in the model, others excluding debt related 
expenditure (interest payments and repayments) is represented by other 
expenditure. 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Stock and Flow Diagram of Government Debt 
 
What the government needs to borrow is the gap between the 
government expenditure and the revenue. The main part of the whole model 
comes the right side of the diagram. The conveyor conception is again adopted 
here. As is shown, both government debt and interest payments use conveyor 
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conception, which is more similar with the real world. The conveyor is a 
material delay, material will stay on the conveyor for a fixed period of time. 
For the case we are discussing, the government borrowing is the material 
which will go onto conveyor; debt repayments is the material which will get 
down from conveyor. Once the government borrowing is occurred, it goes 
onto the conveyor and stays on it until it is due then get down from the 
conveyor, meaning that this sum of debt borrowed 7 years (weighted maturity 
time is 7 years) ago is repaid. All the government borrowings on the conveyor 
are the total government debt. 
 
The working mechanism of interest payments is the same with 
government. Assuming all the debt is fixed interest rate debt, the interest for 
new government borrowing is calculated once government borrowing 
occurred.  This interest to be paid then goes onto the conveyor of interest 
payments. The government will pay this interest to its creditor for 7 years until 
it is due, then both the principal and interests for principal are paid off. Interest 
payments conveyor holds the total interests the government need pay for the 
single year. 
 
Both interest payments and debt repayments constitute the debt 
expenditure of the government. The debt expenditure adds up to government 
expenditure for a lager gap, and then results in more government borrowing. 
 
The budget deficit is the net government borrowing, it is the gap 
between the government expenditure and the revenue excluding debt 
repayments. 
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5. Model Validation 
 
No model has ever been or ever will be thoroughly validated… “Useful”, 
“illuminating”, “convincing”, or “inspiring confidence” are more apt descriptors 
applying to models than “valid” (Greenberger, 1976). 
 
All models are limited, or simplified representations of the real world (Sterman, 
2000). But policymakers need models to help them to make decisions. The objective 
of model validation is to build the confidence of the model. 
 
The time span for model simulation is from beginning of 2001 to end of 2009, the 
model validations are also in the same time span. In all graphs below, I name the 
behavior simulated from the model formulation (without any policies) the Base Run. 
And the  
 
  
  38 
 Reference Mode Replication Test 5.1.
 
Reference mode replication is the most direct method to build the confidence 
to the model. Because the research emphasis is on the government debt, I take 
historic government debt as the reference mode and include the model simulation 
results to compare with reference mode. Figure 5.1 displays both the simulated 
result of government debt and its reference mode. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Comparison between Simulated Behavior and Reference Mode of Government Debt 
Scenario 1: Simulated Behavior of Government Debt 
Scenario 2: Historic Data of Government Debt 
 
Figure 5.2 displays the comparison of government debt as a percentage of 
GDP. 
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Figure 5.2: Comparison between Simulated Behavior and Reference Mode of Government Debt as a 
Percentage of GDP 
Scenario 1: Simulated Behavior of Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
Scenario 2: Historic Data of Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
 
 
From Diagrams above, the simulated behaviors roughly replicated the 
reference mode, especially the trends of simulations. 
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 Extreme Condition Test 5.2.
 
From reference mode replication test, we have built basic confidence to the 
model, but we don’t know if the structure is robust enough – robust under extreme 
conditions. In order to confirm that and fix flaws in the model, extreme condition 
test becomes necessary. 
 
Referring Figure 4.14, taxation system is a very important module of the 
model. It is the source of government revenue and some of its outputs have 
influence on almost all main branches of government expenditure at the same time 
and as well as government debt. Labor share is selected to implement this test. 
 
Labor share is the percentage that how much of GDP distributes to the labor 
force. The initial value for labor share is 0.6, meaning that 60% of GDP will 
distribute to the labor force, which is set as the base run. Then labor share will be 
change to extreme values – 0 and 1. Main simulation results (numbered by 2) will 
be compared with the ones in base run (numbered by 1) to see if the model under 
extreme conditions is reasonable. 
 
Labor share=0 
 
When labor share=0, all GDP will go into corporates other than labors. As a 
result, nominal wages is 0, there is no social contribution, no personal income tax. 
The only tax revenue of government is from corporate income tax. So government 
revenue will be less, the expenditure in pension and civil servants wages are all 0, 
the government will pay all healthcare bills for people. 
 
Figure 5.3 shows that annual income tax overlaps with each other in 
simulations, that’s because the tax rates both for personal and corporate are the 
same, however GDP distributes between labor and corporate, the tax for income is 
always the same. 
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Figure 5.3: Annual Income Tax 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior When Labor Share=0 
 
Social contribution includes personal social contribution and corporate social 
contribution which are all based on nominal wages, it turns to 0 when labor 
share=0, as shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Annual Social Contribution 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior When Labor Share=0 
 
Figure 5.5 displays that annual pension payment turns to 0 when labor 
share=0, because pension derives from nominal wages. 
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Figure 5.5: Annual Pension Payment 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior When Labor Share=0 
 
Figure 5.6 shows civil servants payroll is 0, because labor share=0, none of 
personals can get wages. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Annual Civil Servants Payroll 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior When Labor Share=0 
 
Figure 5.7 shows that public healthcare expenditure is higher than base run, 
that’s because people have no money pay bills at all, the private payment in base 
run need be paid by government also. 
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Figure 5.7: Public Healthcare Expenditure 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior When Labor Share=0 
 
Labor share=1 
 
When labor share=1, all GDP will go into the labor force other than 
corporates. As a result, nominal wages is the whole GDP, there is no corporate 
social contribution, no corporate income tax. The tax revenue of government is 
from personal income tax and personal social contribution. So government 
revenue will be less, while the expenditure in pension and civil servants wages are 
much higher. 
 
Figure 5.8 ~ Figure 5.12 give simulation results on condition that labor 
share=1. All these simulations below are corresponding with the ones (Figure 5.3 
~ Figure 5.7) on condition that labor share=0. 
 
Figure 5.8 shares the same result with Figure 5.3, because both personal and 
corporate tax rate are 24%. Under extreme conditions, annual income tax is all 
from either nominal wages or corporate profits – the whole GDP. 
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Figure 5.8: Annual Income Tax 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior When Labor Share=1 
 
When labor share =1, the whole GDP becomes nominal wage of labor force, 
corporate profits is 0. Corporate social contribution is paid by corporates 
according to labors’ wages, so it becomes 0 on condition that labor share=1 in 
order that annual social contribution is lower than base run. Figure 5.9 displays 
the comparison. 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Annual Social Contribution 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior When Labor Share=1 
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Pension and civil servants wages are all derived from nominal wages, the 
government spending on these two functions will be higher if the whole GDP 
becomes nominal wages. Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11 show the changes. 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Annual Pension Payment 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior When Labor Share=1 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Annual Civil Servants Payroll 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior When Labor Share=1 
 
Healthcare expenditure is paid both by public and private, on condition that 
labor share=1, nominal wages and social contribution are all insured, that’s why 
public healthcare expenditure has no change between the comparison. 
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Figure 5.12: Public Healthcare Expenditure 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior When Labor Share=1 
 
Based on all simulations above, the model can generate reasonable results 
under extreme conditions, which contributes robustness to the model. The 
confidence to the model is also confirmed again by extreme condition test.  
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 Structure-Behavior Test 5.3.
 
The entire model is aggregation of five modules and a modules embedded 
top-level model (Figure 4.14). Structure-Behavior test could verify whether the 
model consists with the realism of real logic. In this section, we will go through 
these modules and main feedback loops to see whether they work reasonably, how 
they would work in the model, what the effects of the modules and feedback 
loops. 
 
The test is implemented into two parts – modules-cut test and feedback loops-
cut test.  
 
5.3.1. Modules-Cut Test 
 
The model includes five modules which have been described in section 
4.4 Stock & Flow Diagram – population, taxation system, pension system, 
healthcare system and civil servants system. Thereinto, population takes a 
basic role to provide mandatory data to other modules such as the labor for 
employment, the base for pension population; taxation system is the main 
source of government revenue, it generates nominal wages, the reference 
frame both for pension system and civil servants system, and the most 
important – government revenue; pension system gives annual pension 
payment from the government; healthcare outputs public healthcare 
expenditure; and civil servants system produces annual civil servants payroll. 
These modules are main departments for government revenue and 
expenditure. 
 
The test will be implemented by adding modules one by one – but 
population module and top-level model are run all the time – to see if the 
simulations are reasonable. The sequence is as below: 
 
1). Population module + top-level model 
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2). Adding taxation system module 
3). Adding pension system module 
4). Adding healthcare system module 
5). Adding civil servants system module 
 
In Scenario 1, only population module and top-level model are run. 
Government revenue and government expenditure modules only offer the 
initial values for their outputs; After taxation system module is activated, the 
behavior of Scenario 2 may be very different with the one in Scenario 1, 
because government borrowing would be much less along with tax revenue 
taking effect while government expenditures are still keeping the initial 
values. Scenario 3 to Scenario 5 will show the behaviors adding government 
expenditure modules one by one. Because government expenditures are 
activated in these scenarios, there would be more budget deficit, and the 
government debt in each scenario would be bigger one by one. 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Modules-Cut Test 
Scenario 1: Top-level Model + Population Simulation 
Scenario 2: Top-level Model + Population/Taxation System Simulation 
Scenario 3: Top-level Model + Population/Taxation/Pension System Simulation 
Scenario 4: Top-level Model + Population/Taxation/Pension/Healthcare System Simulation 
Scenario 5: Top-level Model + Population/Taxation/Pension/Healthcare/Civil Servants System Simulation 
 
The results are shown in Figure 5.13. Scenario 1 has the highest level 
of debt among all simulations. 
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When taxation system is added to the system, government debt climbs 
for a while and then goes down. Due to the increasing in government revenue 
while government expenditure keeps low – because primary expenditure 
departments are inactive, the government borrowing decreases. And net 
borrowing of government debt decreases and then government debt takes a 
trend of decreasing. 
 
Primary government expenditure modules are added to the system one 
by one in Scenario 3 to Scenario 5. The more expenditure modules are added, 
the higher the government debt. Scenario 5 is the running result of the entire 
model. From the comparison of Figure 5.13, the adding of pension system 
(Scenario 3) and civil servants system (Scenario 5) make two biggest 
increments to the government debt, which explains that these two expenditures 
play an important roll in government expenditure. 
 
5.3.2. Feedback Loops-Cut Test 
 
The feedback loops in the top-level model will be mainly discussed in 
this section. Figure 4.7 shows the feedback loops that have influences on 
government debt. As we can see, there are three reinforcing feedback loops, 
all these loops will be cut one by one to test the effect of each loop. 
 
R1 is cut 
 
Government debt as a percentage of GDP will not be influenced by 
government debt any more after R1 is cut (Figure 5.14). The government debt 
as the numerator in the percentage will keep its initial value all the time so that 
the interest rate would be lower after cutting R1. So the government debt may 
grow much more slowly compared with base run scenario. 
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Figure 5.14: Cutting R1 
 
From Figure 5.15 we can see that government debt in Scenario 2 is 
much smaller than the one in base run. When government debt as a percentage 
of GDP is not high, the government could finance itself through issuing new 
government bonds with lower interest rate. But when the percentage goes 
high, the government financing cost also goes high, it couldn’t finance itself 
successfully unless it issues higher interest rate bonds. The higher interest 
payments, the bigger the government borrowing and then the government 
debt. 
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Figure 5.15: Cutting R1 Simulation 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior after Cutting R1 
 
R2 is cut 
 
The increasing in government borrowing wouldn’t increase the new 
interest after R2 is cut. Government borrowing in the equation of new interest 
will keep its initial value. Because the interest payments wouldn’t be increased 
by the increasing in government borrowing, that less interest payments than it 
would be before R2 is cut could result in less government borrowing in 
following feedbacks. As a result, the government debt would be less than its 
behavior before cutting R2. 
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Figure 5.16: Cutting R2 
 
Figure 5.17 shows the simulation result after R2 is cut. The 
government debt gets lower compared with the simulation in normal status, 
which is coincident with our expectation. Comparing Figure 5.17 with Figure 
5.15, we can also find that the effect of reinforcing loop R2 is stronger than 
that of R1. The behavior difference is apparent in Figure 5.17 for medium-
term period. 
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Figure 5.17: Cutting R2 Simulation 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior after Cutting R2 
 
R3 is cut 
 
As discussed above in section 4.2.6 Government Debt, R3 and C1 fully 
counteract with each other, so debt repayments itself actually has no effect on 
government debt and budget deficit. In order to cut loop R3, we can set debt 
repayments as its initial value in the equation of debt expenditure, after which 
C1 wouldn’t be balanced by the feedback from debt repayments to 
government borrowing, the government debt could grow more slowly than the 
its behavior before. 
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Figure 5.18: Cutting R3 
 
Figure 5.19 shows the government debt base run and its behavior after 
cutting R3. It coincides with our expectation but there is something interesting 
that the 2 scenarios overlap in the first 7 years. That’s because the maturity 
time is 7 years and the debt repayments in these 7 years are the same with its 
initial value. 
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Figure 5.19: Cutting R3 Simulation 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Behavior after Cutting R3 
 
From the feedback loop-cut test above, we found that the feedback of 
interest payments takes apparent effect in government debt. Both reinforcing 
loop R1 and R2 loop interest payments and government debt in. These interest 
payments feedback loops in top-level model are responsible for the 
problematic behavior. But interest payments is only one of factors which 
contribute to high-level of government debt. As what we know from 
introduction, the Greek welfare system is a demand-driven system. The public 
expenditure is all based on demand and with no consideration on supply, so 
that no feedbacks to public expenditure is another reason why government 
debt could be driven so high. From the module-cut test, pension system and 
civil servants system are two bigger consuming systems. The expenditures on 
these systems will eventually contribute to more government borrowing and 
then high government debt. 
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 Parameter Sensitivity Test 5.4.
 
Through the tests above, we feel comfortable about and have built enough 
confidence to the model. Parameters or variables are necessary for a model, but 
the function and effects are different. The sensitivity of parameters can provide 
support when formulating policies. For the model on which the paper is based, 
there are some parameters that are possible for government to control by 
administrative methods, then these methods could be potential policies to solve 
the problem which the government is facing.  
 
5.4.1. Black Economy As a Percentage of GDP 
 
Black economy, also called parallel economy, shadow economy, or 
underground economy, is usually untraceable, and hence untaxable. In other 
words, they are business dealings that are not reflected in a country's GDP 
computations. An integral part of most third-world and many first-world 
economies, it is a cash-based system in which transaction records are kept in 
secret account books (called “number two” accounts). Black economy and 
black money go hand in hand. Though it employs illegal (and even criminal) 
methods, it is a survival practice in repressive tax regimens or where 
legitimate expression of entrepreneurial activity is made unnecessarily 
difficult by a maze of regulations. 
 
In Greece, black economy accounts for a large ratio of its economy, 
reaching 25% of GDP. This is a big number compared with other Eurozone 
members. The presence of black economy decreases revenue of government 
directly. In this section, the sensitivity of black economy as a percentage of 
GDP will be tested. 
 
In the test, the model will be run three times, values of candidate 
parameter in three runs are different. These values are design to be 
incremental from 20% off to 20% up. So the values of candidate parameter 
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will be 0.2, 0.25 and 0.3 corresponding to the Scenario 1 to Scenario 3. 
Scenario 2 is actually the Base Run. 
 
 
Figure 5.20: Sensitivity Test of Black Economy As a Percentage of GDP 
Scenario 1: Black Economy As a Percentage of GDP=20% 
Scenario 2: Black Economy As a Percentage of GDP=25% (Base Run) 
Scenario 3: Black Economy As a Percentage of GDP=30% 
 
Figure 5.20 shows the test result. Scenario 1 is the result when 
candidate parameter is set to 0.2, meaning that 5% of GDP’s amount of black 
economy is moved back to legal market, which increases the government 
revenue. Scenario 2 is reference mode and simulation 3 is the result when 
candidate parameter is set to 0.3, which means 5% of GDP is transferred to 
black economy. We can see that the black economy sensitivity to government 
debt is high. The government debt changes a lot given 20% change in black 
economy. 
 
5.4.2. Replacement Rate 
 
As explained before, replacement rate is the percentage of a worker's 
pre-retirement income that is paid out by a pension program upon retirement. 
The higher the replacement rate, the more pension the pensioners can get. 
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In reference mode replication simulation, replacement rate is 60%, so 
in sensitivity test, its values will be set to 0.48, 0.6, 0.72. 
 
 
Figure 5.21: Sensitivity Test of Replacement Rate 
Scenario 1: Replacement Rate=48% 
Scenario 2: Replacement Rate=60% (Base Run) 
Scenario 3: Replacement Rate=72% 
 
Referred to Figure 5.21, replacement rate to government debt is more 
sensitive than black economy rate. 
 
5.4.3. Healthcare Spending As a Percentage of GDP 
 
Healthcare spending is the total spending of Greece on healthcare 
without considering who pays the bills. Greece, like most of European 
countries, the government pays healthcare bills for people who have social 
insurance, while others will pay bills out of pockets. Based on the 2011 report 
of OECD, the healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP is 9%, ranking 
ahead among OECD countries. 
 
In this test, the percentage is set to 0.072, 0.09, 0.108 and simulation 
results are displayed in Figure 5.22. 
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Figure 5.22: Sensitivity Test of Healthcare Spending As a Percentage of GDP 
Scenario 1: Healthcare Spending As a Percentage of GDP=7.2% 
Scenario 2: Healthcare Spending As a Percentage of GDP=9% (Base Run) 
Scenario 3: Healthcare Spending As a Percentage of GDP=10.8% 
 
The sensitivity of healthcare spending rate is less than those two 
parameters discussed above. 
 
5.4.4. PC (Per Capita) Civil Servants Subsidy 
 
Part of Greek civil servants can have subsidies because of speaking a 
foreign language, using a computer or getting to work on time. The subsidy is 
€10,000. Considering the 20% change in the value of candidate parameter, the 
values will be set from €8,000 to €12,000. 
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Figure 5.23: Sensitivity Test of PC Civil Servants Subsidy 
Scenario 1: PC Civil Servants Subsidy=8,000 Euros 
Scenario 2: PC Civil Servants Subsidy=10,000 Euros (Base Run) 
Scenario 3: PC Civil Servants Subsidy=12,000 Euros 
 
Figure 5.23 displays that the sensitivity of pc civil servants subsidy to 
government debt is the least among all parameters in the test, which indicates 
that change in pc civil servants subsidy has little influence on government 
debt. 
 
5.4.5. CS (Civil Servants) Wages Growth Rate 
 
From 2001, civil servants wages grew at a high and stable rate from 
which the nominal wages growth rate is a far cry. But civil servants wages are 
all paid by government who will bear the whole burden of quick growing in 
civil servants wages. 
 
In the test, the growth rate will be set to 0.048, 0.06 and 0.072. 
        
2001.00 2003.25 2005.50 2007.75 2010.00
1e+11
2.5e+11
4e+11
Government Debt: 1 - 2 - 3 - 
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
  61 
 
Figure 5.24: Sensitivity Test of CS Wages Growth Rate 
Scenario 1: CS Wages Growth Rate=4.8% 
Scenario 2: CS Wages Growth Rate=6% (Base Run) 
Scenario 3: CS Wages Growth Rate=7.2% 
 
The same with the sensitivity of pc civil servants subsidy, the 
sensitivity of civil servants wages growth rate is low. 
 
Summing up the above, black economy as a percentage of GDP, 
replacement rate and healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP are the most 
sensitive parameters for the government debt. They distributes in both 
government revenue and government expenditure modules. These parameters 
may be discussed again in policy analysis chapter, because they are the most 
important parameters for government to control for the sake of regulating the 
high-level of government debt. 
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6. Policy Analysis 
 
Greece today faces a double challenge: to consolidate the country’s fiscal position 
through effective fiscal and structural policies aimed at reducing the budget deficit 
and lowering the public debt to GDP ratio; and to secure the conditions for economic 
development in the years to come through addressing long-standing structural 
weaknesses and thereby putting the economy on a new and sustainable growth path 
(Hellenic Governemnt, 2010). 
 
The former constitutes a necessary condition for the latter. Successful fiscal 
consolidation creates a stable economic environment, which allows for a more 
efficient deployment of public resources, while also reducing “crowding out” of 
private sector funds. 
 
To these twin challenges is added a third: to address the credibility deficit which 
the country’s economic policy currently faces. The recent large revisions in deficit 
figures, coupled with previous failed attempts at fiscal consolidation make it 
increasingly difficult for Greece to continue funding its public deficits and large stock 
of debt in international capital markets. Addressing this problem calls for institutional 
reform which will restore credibility in data, the budgeting process and the operation 
of the public sector more generally. 
 
The size of the fiscal adjustment requires a series of structural measures that 
directly reduce public expenditures and improve government revenues, while also 
addressing long-standing structural weaknesses. It involves initiatives to control 
public spending and completely overhaul the way the budget is prepared and 
executed, as well as broaden the tax base and reform the tax system. This task has to 
be implemented in the context of unfavorable domestic and international economic 
conditions. The latter are marked by uncertainty and weak growth and financial 
institutions. On the domestic front, the sources of the prolonged rapid growth that 
Greece experienced for more than a decade, mostly credit expansion that followed the 
EMU entry, have run their course. 
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The government’s fiscal policy strategy is based on five key pillars, which 
incorporate the lessons learned to date. The strategy is further discussed on the quality 
of public finances and includes actions to: 
 
 Restore credibility in fiscal statistics by making the National Statistics 
Service an independent legal entity and phasing in, during the first quarter 
of 2010, all the necessary checks and balances that will improve the 
accuracy and reporting of fiscal statistics. 
 Improve transparency in fiscal management, by changing the process of 
budgeting, monitoring and evaluating its implementation, and moving 
towards a program-based budget. 
 Reform the tax system in order to make it simple, stable, transparent and 
fair, and to effectively fight tax evasion by improving auditing activities 
and exchanging of information between auditing agencies. 
 Achieve control of primary expenditures by containing personnel and 
other current outlays and reallocating expenditures more effectively. 
 Implement the necessary structural reforms to enhance competitiveness 
and the efficient functioning of the economy. 
 
The following sections introduce the policies formulated by the Greek government 
for the country’s primary revenue and expenditure systems, which are also the 
condition of exchanging the bailout package from other member states and IMF. 
These policies are mainly designed for taxation system, pension system, healthcare 
system and civil servants system. Other possible policies would also be discussed 
afterwards. 
 
In simulations with policies, the time scope is set between 2001 and end of 2030, 
which could give results of the policies in both medium-term period and relative long-
term. The effects of the policies or the combinations of policies are intuitionistic 
through diagrams which show comparisons of the simulation results in base run 
without policies and the ones with policies. Figure 6.1 displays the projections 
without fiscal austerity policies and reforms, which is simulated to 2030 with the 
same structure used in Base Run. The government debt as a percentage of GDP goes 
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from 126.29% in 2009 to a dramatic level – 2,249% in 2030, and the volume of 
government debt gets from “only” €297 billion in 2009 to €15,119 billion in 2030. In 
all diagrams below, there is an indicator called “government debt ceiling 60%”. It is 
the ceiling or upper limit for the “government debt as a percentage of GDP”, which is 
the stipulation both in the Maastricht Treaty and in Stability and Growth Pact. The 
simulated result will be compared with the ceiling, which can give you an 
intuitionistic view. So the simulation in Figure 6.1 is the new Base Run, all 
simulations in this section will be compared with the Base Run in order to have a 
direct sense of the effect of policies. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Projections to 2030 without Policies 
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 Taxation Reform 6.1.
 
According to the Greek tax system, if you stay and work in the country you 
have to pay taxes. However, you may be eligible for certain tax allowances, 
depending on your family situation, which are taken into account when calculating 
your taxable income, as well as the amount of tax you are liable to pay. If you are 
employed, your employer will deduct income tax from your wages, daily 
allowances or other remuneration. Table 6.1 shows the individual income tax rate 
of 2009. For salary not exceeding €12,000 are tax-exempt. 
 
Table 6.1: Individual Income Tax Rate of Greece 
Tax % The Tax Base (EURO) 
0 1 - 12,000 
25 12,001 - 30,000 
35 30,001 - 75,000 
40 75,001 and over 
 
Also liable to tax are general and limited partnerships, associations of civil 
law engaged in business or exercising a profession, civil associations of a profit-
making or non-profitmaking nature, participating companies and joint venture. 
 
Social security contribution is another main part of government revenue 
besides income tax. An employer is obligated to deduct tax at source from an 
employee and to make additional contributions. 
 
Till the debt crisis burst out, tax evasion and tax avoidance were popular. It’s 
estimated that black economy in Greece accounts for 25% of GDP, which is not 
taxed. 
 
The individual income tax imposed on the income of employees has different 
levels, for the sake of simplifying the model, a weighted tax rate for individual 
income is used and set to 24%. Corporate tax rate is also 24%, while social 
contribution rates for individual and corporate are 11% and 15%. 
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The significant deterioration in the deficit of the general government in 2009, 
which can only partly be attributed to the unprecedented global crisis, uncovered 
the weaknesses of tax policy and the tax collection mechanisms, issues that must 
be effectively tackled in order to establish a sustainable fiscal environment. The 
budgetary process and inefficiencies in the tax collection mechanism are of 
significant importance. In this context the government had already launched a 
comprehensive tax reform effort towards a fairer, more transparent and legitimate 
system to facilitate compliance and increase revenues. Some of the measures will 
further develop elements already introduced in the 2010 budget (such as efforts to 
simplify the system and broaden the tax base through eliminating exemptions, 
thus contributing to revenues and facilitating tax). 
 
The tax reform initiative will also be complemented by a sustained effort to 
strengthen capacities to detect and effectively fight widespread tax avoidance and 
tax evasion, including increasing collection effectiveness, limiting corruption, 
improving self-compliance. 
 
Corresponding to our model, the percentage of black economy is reduced to 
20% of GDP. The tax rates for both employers and employees are assumed to 
increase by 1 percentage. During the year of 2010, we can see lots of riots in 
Greek streets after the fiscal austerity came out. The government is also 
considering lifting tax rates directly but it has no result yet.  
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Figure 6.2: Tax Reform 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Projections to 2030 with Tax Reform 
 
Figure 6.2 offers the projections with tax reform (Scenario 2). The 
government debt becomes €11,604 billion, 1,644% of GDP. And budget deficit 
goes to 327% of GDP, while the ceiling for it is only 3%. 
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 Pension Reform 6.2.
 
The pension system of Greece is a representative case of the “Mediterranean 
welfare state”, which is characterized by extensive segmentation, very high 
payroll tax rates, and yet inadequate pension benefits(Nektarios, 2009).  
 
The normal pension age is 65 for both men and women. A pension from this 
age requires a minimum of 4,500 days of contributions (equivalent to 15 years). 
Workers with a contribution record of 11,100 working days (37 years) can retire 
on a full benefit regardless of age. There are concessions for people who work in 
arduous or unhygienic occupations and for women with dependent or disabled 
children. For labor-market entrants from 1993, the pension is 2% of earnings for 
each year of contributions up to 35 years. There is therefore a maximum 
replacement rate of 70% for people retiring at the normal age or earlier. However, 
for working after the age of 65 and a contribution period of 35 years, there is a 
higher accrual of 3.3% per year, for a maximum of three years, while there is no 
accrual rate for those working after this period (maximum replacement rate of 
80%). In the model, a weighted replacement rate of 60% takes effect. The 
earnings measure is the average over the last five years before retirement. Each 
pensioner can have 14 months’ pension every year. 
 
Left unchanged, public pension expenditures under the existing system would 
have doubled from around 11% of GDP in 2010 to 24% in 2060. This situation is 
clearly unsustainable. 
 
The Greek Parliament in July of 2010 passed sweeping pension reforms that 
overhaul the country’s existing private and public pension systems and bring its 
viability in line with the EU average. This ensures the system’s medium and long-
term sustainability, as well as a long-term actuarial balance. The pension reform 
includes: 
 
 Merges existing pension funds into three and introduces a unified new 
system for current and future employees 
  69 
 Introduces a unified statutory retirement age of 65 years by December 
2013, increasing in line with changes in life expectancy 
 Increases the minimum early retirement age to 60 by 2011 
 Increases the minimum contribution period for retirement on a full 
pension from 35-37 to 40 years by 2015 
 Cuts pension benefits by 6 percent a year for people retiring between 
the ages of 60 and 65 with less than 40 years of pension contributions 
 Eliminates the 13th and 14th monthly pensions 
 Extends the calculation of the pensionable earnings from the current 
last five years to the entire lifetime earnings 
 Redistributes pensions in favor on lower ones by imposing a monthly 
tax on pensions above 1,400 euros from August 2010 
 
In the model, the pension is decided mainly by four parameters: pension base, 
replacement rate, 12/14 months decision and pensioners. When time beyond 2010, 
most of pension reforms take effect. Pension base will be extended to whole 
lifetime earnings instead of the last 5 years; replacement rate could be kept the 
same but there will be only 12 monthly pensions. 
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Figure 6.3: Tax/Pension Reform 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Projections to 2030 with Tax Reform 
Scenario 3: Projections to 2030 with Tax/Pension Reform 
 
Figure 6.3 shows the projections with tax/pension reforms. Scenario 3 in the 
lower diagram is the behavior under the tax and pension reform. It is decreased a 
lot compared with the other 2 projections. The government debt is 4,370 billion 
Euros, accounting for 619% of GDP and 115% for budget deficit.  
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 Healthcare Reform 6.3.
 
The containment of health care expenditures will be achieved mainly through 
the re-introduction of restrictions in the list of medicines provided by the health 
care branches of the social insurance funds. 
 
Total health spending accounted for 9.7 % of GDP in Greece in 2007, above 
the 2008 average of 9.0% in OECD countries. Greece ranks below the OECD 
average in terms of health spending per capita, with spending of 2687 USD in 
2007 (adjusted for purchasing power parity), compared with an OECD average of 
3060 USD in 2008. Between 2000 and 2007, health spending per capita in Greece 
increased, in real terms, by 6.9 % per year on average, a growth rate higher than 
the average in OECD countries (4.2%) between 2000 and 2008. The public sector 
is the main source of health funding in all OECD countries. In Greece, 60.3% of 
health spending was funded by public sources in 2007.  The average across OECD 
countries in 2008 is 72.8%. The guiding principles of health reform are as follows:  
 
 Strengthen public regulation. Government will set overall cash limits 
and allocate resources in a transparent fashion, consistent with 
objective criteria. It will reorganize public procurement with a view to 
getting better value for public money. It will recruit hospital staff and 
other managers on merit, and devolve them the responsibility for 
running provider units. It will not be involved in day-to-day 
management of hospitals and other providers.  
 
 Reinforce accountability. Once agreed, budget constraints will be 
inflexible. Public providers, including hospitals, will be instructed to 
operate under fixed budgets. Managers will not be allowed to 
authorize budget overspends, and will be accountable for failing to do 
so. Consultants and other medical personnel will be encouraged to 
participate in drawing up plans for ensuring a more efficient use of 
hospital resources.  
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Figure 6.4: Tax/Pension/Healthcare Reform 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Projections to 2030 with Tax Reform 
Scenario 3: Projections to 2030 with Tax/Pension Reform 
Scenario 4: Projections to 2030 with Tax/Pension/Healthcare Reform 
 
In simulation, healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP is adjusted to 8%. 
Scenario 4 in Figure 6.4 depicts the behavior of new projection adding healthcare 
reform. 
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 Civil Servants Reform 6.4.
 
The main parameter of the “Greek problem” is the functioning of the state 
and of the wider public sector. The excessive growth in the operational cost of the 
state can be attributed mainly to the management of the human resources of the 
public sector, especially personnel recruitment, which leads to an enormous 
growth in wage cost in the public sector. To this is added mismanagement of 
financial resources, waste of resources in the state budget and the budgets of 
public sector organizations. Together they lead to high deficits and the 
accumulation of debt. 
 
As far as recruitment in the public sector is concerned, the past few years saw 
the proliferation of project contracts or fixed-term contracts with no objective 
criteria, growing in total to more than 100.000 per year. To this was added the 
improper use of the “stage” contracts, leading to the recruitment of more than 
60.000 people in the “wider” public sector. Finally, numbers hired increased in all 
cases where personnel categories in the wider public sector were not supervised 
by the Council for Civil Personnel Selection (ASEP), the independent authority 
guaranteeing recruitment with objective and fair criteria. 
 
The new government after the elections stopped all new recruitment, and 
adopted a new bill according to which all recruitments in the “wider” public sector 
are subordinated to the procedures of ASEP. No recruitment can be made without 
its approval and without the implementation of the objective examination 
procedure. The “stage” system has been abolished in the public sector and no 
project contract can be formed without the explicit authorization by ASEP. 
Finally, all recruitment exceptions are abolished, and they are all subordinated to 
the procedures of ASEP. These fundamental changes of a structural nature already 
have a significant impact on the public sector wage bill and will significantly 
affect its medium-term development when combined with the decisions 
announced by the government, namely:  
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 A hiring freeze in 2010, excluding limited hiring in the health, 
security and education sectors (in schools only to fill vacancies). 
 A rule limiting hiring to one new hire for every five retirements as of 
2011. 
 A reduction in short-term contracts of up to one-third in most 
government areas. 
 A reduction in subsidies from 10,000 Euros to 5,000 Euros for those 
who work with computer, speaking foreign language or arriving on 
position on time. 
 A wages freeze in in medium-term and 3% growth rate in long-term, 
which is 6% currently. 
 
Figure 6.5 displays an extra behavior (Scenario 5) with civil servants reform. 
The substantial difference is that the trend of government debt is curved down. 
We can also see from the upper diagram that government debt as a share of GDP 
begins to bend down around 2015 and it goes through the ceiling around 2025. 
Observed intuitively from the diagram above, Civil servants system is another big 
expenditure for government besides pension system. The government debt is 
decreased to 47 billion Euros dramatically, accounting only 2.5% of GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
  75 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Tax/Pension/Healthcare/Civil Servants Reform 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Projections to 2030 with Tax Reform 
Scenario 3: Projections to 2030 with Tax/Pension Reform 
Scenario 4: Projections to 2030 with Tax/Pension/Healthcare Reform 
Scenario 5: Projections to 2030 with Tax/Pension/Healthcare/Civil Servants Reform 
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 Privatization and State Asset Management 6.5.
 
The Greek government has unveiled a wide-ranging privatization and state 
asset management (SAM) program, spanning the state’s holdings in rail, road 
transport, airports, ports, utilities, the gaming industry, and public real estate. The 
program leverages private investment so as to restructure the economy, foster 
economic growth, contribute to fiscal consolidation and raise the overall quality of 
life. 
 
The program puts to use the know-how of the private sector through outright 
sales, concession agreements, initial public offerings, strategic public-private 
partnerships, and the establishment of new holding companies. State 
shareholdings will range from minority stakes of less than 34%, to controlling 
stakes of 51% or more. In a number of cases the government will divest fully from 
its holdings. 
 
It is estimated that the program will reap significant revenues of 15 billion 
Euros during the period 2011~2013, which will contribute to low the debt burden 
both in medium-term and long-term period. 
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Figure 6.6: Tax/Pension/Healthcare/Civil Servants/SAM Reform (medium-term) 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Projections to 2015 with Tax Reform 
Scenario 3: Projections to 2015 with Tax/Pension Reform 
Scenario 4: Projections to 2015 with Tax/Pension/Healthcare Reform 
Scenario 5: Projections to 2015 with Tax/Pension/Healthcare/Civil Servants Reform 
Scenario 6: Projections to 2015 with Tax/Pension/Healthcare/Civil Servants/SAM Reform 
 
Figure 6.6 displays the behaviors with different scenarios within a medium-
term period. The wages for civil servants are frozen. These revenues from the 
program can be used to make the debt burden sustainable by reducing it by 12.5 
percentage points of GDP until 2015 and reducing significantly the burden on the 
Greek taxpayer for interest payments. 
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Figure 6.7: Tax/Pension/Healthcare/Civil Servants/SAM Reform (long-term) 
Scenario 1: Base Run 
Scenario 2: Projections to 2030 with Tax Reform 
Scenario 3: Projections to 2030 with Tax/Pension Reform 
Scenario 4: Projections to 2030 with Tax/Pension/Healthcare Reform 
Scenario 5: Projections to 2030 with Tax/Pension/Healthcare/Civil Servants Reform 
Scenario 6: Projections to 2030 with Tax/Pension/Healthcare/Civil Servants/SAM Reform 
 
Figure 6.7 displays the behaviors with different scenarios within a long-term 
period. Government debt as a share of GDP goes down across the ceiling at 2022, 
3 years before the scenario 5 in Figure 6.5 without SAM policy. 
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 Policy Conclusions 6.6.
 
Nearly all policies analyzed above are from modules of government revenue 
and government expenditure. Those policy parameters are the very parameters 
that should be regulated by the feedback from government debt and budget deficit, 
lacking of which is the important reason why the Greek debt crisis broke out. In 
the model that the paper is based on, I test these parameters exogenously without 
building the feedback loops. But in the real world, they need to be monitored 
during the whole process in order to be adjusted to optimal values through 
information feedback. 
 
The fiscal consolidation program and reform measures discussed above are 
from a perspective of long-term period on condition that the bundle of policies is 
executed strictly. Table 6.2 shows simulation results with different scenarios until 
2030. Reforms on pension and civil servants systems play important roles in 
decreasing the government debt burden. Policies for the same area in long-term 
may be different with the ones in medium-term. Pensions and payrolls of public 
sectors are froze in medium-term fiscal consolidation program, but eventually will 
keep increasing properly in a long-term period. Although the policies didn’t take 
Greece to its expectations mainly due to the larger than projected recession, 
budget deficit in 2010 was beat to 10.5% of GDP, which is nearly 5 percentage 
points reduction just in one year, ranking first in EU countries. 
 
Table 6.2: Simulation Results with Different Scenarios 
 
Debt 
(Billion Euros) 
Debt 
(% of GDP) 
Budget Deficit 
(Billion Euros) 
Budget Deficit 
(% of GDP) 
Base Run 15,119 2,248 2,720 451 
Tax Reform 11,604 1,644 2,069 327 
Pension Reform 4,370 619 729 115 
Healthcare Reform 3,511 497 572 89.8 
Civil Servants Reform 47 6.75 -45 -6.19 
SAM 17 2.5 -10 -1.76 
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Nevertheless, most of reforms are closely related with people’s welfare, such 
as pensions, wages, subsidies, etc. Therefore, there have been lots of riots in 
streets since the fiscal austerity was introduced after the crisis exploded. So 
another problem the government needs to figure out is how to build good public 
relations between the government and the citizens. The citizens need to know 
clearly what their country is actually suffering. 
 
Besides, all reforms are based on a premise that the government could finance 
its budget deficit through issuing new government bonds every year successfully, 
because budget deficit would be present for more than 10 years in accordance 
with simulations. Following twice downgraded for government bonds from rating 
agencies in 2011, the possibility of debt defaulting is discussed by researchers and 
reporters. Asked about default speculation at a news conference in May 2011, 
President of European Central Bank, Mr. Trichet said, “It is not in the cards.” So 
far, Greek and European officials have said consistently that a debt restructuring 
that would cause bondholders to suffer a haircut, or a loss on their holdings, was 
out of the question. But that stance may not preclude a softer option in which 
bondholders might be persuaded to exchange their shorter maturity debt for 
securities with longer maturities and perhaps even a lower interest rate. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
This paper unmasks the veil of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, offering a 
general structure combining budget deficit and government debt. But the government 
revenue and expenditure also has Greek characteristics. Greece, holding one of the 
most generous welfare systems in the world, spends quite a lot on public affairs like 
pensions and public sectors payrolls while earns little from its weak taxation system. 
Moreover, the membership of Eurozone makes it easy for Greece to finance its budget 
from member countries with low interests. After the new voted government went onto 
the stage, they modified the budget deficit twice then followed by the downgrades 
from rating agencies, which triggered the crisis in the end. All in all, the demand-
driven welfare system and the absence of feedback from national account to budget 
deficit accumulate the sovereign debt crisis in Greece. 
 
One of research findings is that the weak government revenue and extravagant 
expenditure are the chief culprits in high budget deficit and government debt, and then 
the high interest payments of the government debt contribute to high budget deficit in 
return. The weak government revenue results from high tax evasion and tax 
avoidance. The shadow economy of Greece, which contributes nothing to the 
government, ranks top in EU countries. On expenditure side, the pension payment, 
civil servants payroll, interest payments and healthcare expenditure all push the 
government expenditure to a very high level. The model built to represent the crisis 
replicates the evolving history of the crisis and at the same time provides a useful tool 
to analyze the dedicated policies used for solving its crisis. 
 
In exchange for bailout from Eurozone member states and IMF, and also for a 
sustainable debt, Greek government put in place a series of related policies and 
reforms. These policies and reforms almost cover all government revenue and 
expenditures such as formulating laws and regulations to decrease the tax evasion and 
tax avoidance in order to cut down the share of shadow economy, freezing the 
pension and civil servants payroll for a medium-term period to reduce the government 
expenditure and so on. These policies and reforms are quantized and tested on the 
model for a long-term period. And we found that they do take big effect in the 
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government debt, especially the policies for pension system (Figure 6.3) and civil 
servants system (Figure 6.5), which could be seen in Table 6.2, under the modeling 
assumption that they are executed strictly. Any policies have their dual character, on 
one hand, they make more tax revenue and less government expenditure; on the other 
hand, they directly decrease the life quality of Greek who have been accustomed to 
high standard of life for a long time. That’s the reason why various riots are full of 
streets since the government declared the fiscal austerity. If without fiscal austerity 
policies, Greece cannot finance itself to repay the matured government debt, 
defaulting would be true at that time. Once Greece defaults, investors would lose 
confidence, which could bring about a wave of panic selling of Euros. And there 
would be a risk of contagion to other PIGS countries and trigger a much larger scale 
of panic. The Inflation in Eurozone would not be prevented then.  
 
On another side, what ensures the policies implemented without a hitch in the 
model is that the government can finance successfully to fund the budget deficit. But 
in return, the Greek government need implement these fiscal consolidation policies 
rigorously even need more deflationary policies in order to acquire more funds in the 
future. In a medium-term, the government need recover the investors’ confidence in 
order to make the government debt sustainable, otherwise the government either 
defaults or restructures its debt or EU continues to fund Greece, which will induce 
more resistance in “healthier” countries. Just a few days before the paper is finished, 
end of May 2011, European leaders were negotiating a deal that would lead to 
unprecedented outside intervention in the Greek economy, including international 
involvement in tax collection and privatization of state assets, in exchange for new 
bail-out loans for Greece. 
 
EMU member states share the same monetary policies but implement their own 
fiscal policies, so that sometimes their strengths don’t match their ambitions, when 
handling intractable economic problems. It has been estimated that the reintroduction 
of a national currency, while giving the Greek government an extra instrument for 
macroeconomic stability, would imply a new Drachma falling by 80 per cent against 
the new Deutschmark; this gap would be around 50 per cent for the new Irish, 
Portuguese or Spanish currencies (Tilford, 2010).It is unlikely that this would be less 
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painful for their citizens and their economies than the present austerity plans. But this 
would also deal a serious blow to Germany’s trade balance and growth as much of its 
export goes to EU countries (Soros, 2010). 
 
The only and final way to solve this crisis is to depend on the citizens of Greece 
themselves. It’s time for both Hellenic Government and Hellene to be all of one mind 
to bend their efforts in a single direction. It’s time for all Hellene to “ask not what 
your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country (John F. 
Kennedy)”. 
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Appendix 
 
Equations 
 
Top-Level Model: 
Government_Debt(t) = Government_Debt(t - dt) + (government_borrowing - 
debt_repayments) * dt 
INIT Government_Debt = 141e9 
 TRANSIT TIME = varies 
 INFLOW LIMIT = ∞ 
 CAPACITY = ∞ 
INFLOWS: 
government_borrowing = max(0,government_expenditure-government_revenue) 
OUTFLOWS: 
debt_repayments = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
 TRANSIT TIME = maturity_time 
Interest_Payments(t) = Interest_Payments(t - dt) + (interest_to_be_paid - 
interest_paid_off) * dt 
INIT Interest_Payments = 5.64e9 
 TRANSIT TIME = varies 
 INFLOW LIMIT = ∞ 
 CAPACITY = ∞ 
INFLOWS: 
interest_to_be_paid = interest_for_new_borrowing 
OUTFLOWS: 
interest_paid_off = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
 TRANSIT TIME = maturity_time 
budget_deficit = government_borrowing-debt_repayments 
budget_deficit_%_of_GDP = 
budget_deficit/Taxation_System.total_nominal_GDP*100 
budget_deficit_ceiling_3% = 3 
debt_expenditure = Interest_Payments+debt_repayments 
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government_debt_%_of_GDP = 
Government_Debt/Taxation_System.total_nominal_GDP*100 
government_debt_ceiling_60% = 60 
government_expenditure = 
primary_expenditure+other_expenditure+debt_expenditure 
government_revenue = 
Taxation_System.annual_social_contribution+Taxation_System.annual_income_tax+
state_asset_management_decision 
interest_for_new_borrowing = 
init(government_borrowing)*government_bond_interest_rate 
maturity_time = 7 
primary_expenditure = 
Civil_Servants_Wages_System.annual_civil_servants_payroll+Healthcare_System.pu
blic_healthcare_expenditure+Pension_System.annual_pension_payment 
state_asset_management_decision = if (time>2011 and time<2017 and 
state_asset_management_policy_switch=1) then state_asset_management_income 
else 0 
state_asset_management_policy_switch = 0 
government_bond_interest_rate = 
GRAPH(government_debt_%_of_GDP/init(government_debt_%_of_GDP)) 
(0.5, 0.035), (0.65, 0.037), (0.8, 0.04), (0.95, 0.043), (1.10, 0.047), (1.25, 0.055), 
(1.40, 0.089), (1.55, 0.16), (1.70, 0.174), (1.85, 0.184), (2.00, 0.199) 
historic_budget_deficit = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 5.1e+09), (2002, 6.5e+09), (2003, 7.5e+09), (2004, 9.7e+09), (2005, 1.4e+10), 
(2006, 1e+10), (2007, 1.2e+10), (2008, 1.4e+10), (2009, 2.2e+10), (2010, 3.6e+10) 
historic_government_debt = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 1.4e+11), (2002, 1.5e+11), (2003, 1.6e+11), (2004, 1.7e+11), (2005, 1.8e+11), 
(2006, 2e+11), (2007, 2.2e+11), (2008, 2.4e+11), (2009, 2.6e+11), (2010, 3e+11) 
historic_government_debt_%_of_GDP = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 103), (2002, 104), (2003, 102), (2004, 97.4), (2005, 98.6), (2006, 100), (2007, 
106), (2008, 105), (2009, 110), (2010, 127) 
historic_government_expenditure = GRAPH(TIME) 
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(2001, 6.4e+10), (2002, 6.6e+10), (2003, 7.1e+10), (2004, 7.7e+10), (2005, 8.4e+10), 
(2006, 8.6e+10), (2007, 9.5e+10), (2008, 1.1e+11), (2009, 1.2e+11), (2010, 1.2e+11) 
historic_government_revenue = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 5.9e+10), (2002, 6e+10), (2003, 6.3e+10), (2004, 6.7e+10), (2005, 7.1e+10), 
(2006, 7.5e+10), (2007, 8.3e+10), (2008, 9e+10), (2009, 9.4e+10), (2010, 8.9e+10) 
other_expenditure = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 1.6e+10), (2002, 1.9e+10), (2003, 2.4e+10), (2004, 2.6e+10), (2005, 3e+10), 
(2006, 3.3e+10), (2007, 3.7e+10), (2008, 4e+10), (2009, 4.5e+10), (2010, 4.9e+10), 
(2011, 5.1e+10), (2012, 5.3e+10), (2013, 5.5e+10), (2014, 5.6e+10), (2015, 5.6e+10), 
(2016, 5.7e+10), (2017, 5.7e+10), (2018, 5.8e+10), (2019, 5.9e+10), (2020, 5.9e+10), 
(2021, 6.1e+10), (2022, 6.2e+10), (2023, 6.2e+10), (2024, 6.3e+10), (2025, 6.4e+10), 
(2026, 6.6e+10), (2027, 6.7e+10), (2028, 6.8e+10), (2029, 7e+10), (2030, 7.1e+10) 
state_asset_management_income = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2011, 0.00), (2012, 3e+09), (2013, 7e+09), (2014, 5e+09), (2015, 2e+10), (2016, 
1.5e+10), (2017, 0.00) 
 
Civil Servants Wages System: 
Civil_Servants_Population(t) = Civil_Servants_Population(t - dt) + 
(becoming_civil_servants - civil_servants_retiring - civil_servants_death) * dt 
INIT Civil_Servants_Population = 6.5E5 
INFLOWS: 
becoming_civil_servants = 
smth1(civil_servants_recruiting_policy_decision*(civil_servants_retiring+civil_serva
nts_death),0.5) 
OUTFLOWS: 
civil_servants_retiring = Civil_Servants_Population/period_of_civil_service 
civil_servants_death = Civil_Servants_Population*Population.workage_death_rate 
PC_Civil_Servants_Wages(t) = PC_Civil_Servants_Wages(t - dt) + 
(cs_wages_chg_rate) * dt 
INIT PC_Civil_Servants_Wages = Taxation_System.nominal_wages_per_woker 
INFLOWS: 
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cs_wages_chg_rate = 
PC_Civil_Servants_Wages*smth1(CS_wages_growth_rate_decision,time_to_adjust_
pc_cs_wages) 
Retired_Civil_Servants_Population(t) = Retired_Civil_Servants_Population(t - dt) + 
(civil_servants_retiring - retired_civil_servants_death) * dt 
INIT Retired_Civil_Servants_Population = 1.5e5 
INFLOWS: 
civil_servants_retiring = Civil_Servants_Population/period_of_civil_service 
OUTFLOWS: 
retired_civil_servants_death = 
Retired_Civil_Servants_Population/Population.elderage_duration 
annual_civil_servants_payroll = 
Civil_Servants_Population*(PC_Civil_Servants_Wages/12)*14+0.3*Civil_Servants_
Population*(if (Taxation_System.labor_share>0) then 
civil_servants_subsidy_policy_decision else 0) 
civil_servants_recruiting_policy_decision = if(time>2010) and 
(CS_system_policy_switch=1) then civil_servants_recruit_retire_ratio else 1 
civil_servants_recruit_retire_ratio = 1/5 
civil_servants_subsidy_policy_decision = if(time>2010) and 
(CS_system_policy_switch=1) then pc_civil_servants_subsidy else 
pc_civil_servants_subsidy_till_2009 
CS_system_policy_switch = 0 
CS_wages_growth_rate = 0.06 
CS_wages_growth_rate_decision = if(time>2010) and (CS_system_policy_switch=1) 
then CS_wages_growth_rate else CS_wages_growth_rate_till_2009 
CS_wages_growth_rate_till_2009 = 0.06 
pc_civil_servants_subsidy = 10000 
pc_civil_servants_subsidy_till_2009 = 10000 
period_of_civil_service = 32.4 
time_to_adjust_pc_cs_wages = 1 
 
Healthcare System: 
healthcare_policy_switch = 0 
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healthcare_spending_%_of_GDP = 0.09 
healthcare_spending_%_of_GDP_decision = if (time>2010) and 
(healthcare_policy_switch=1) then healthcare_spending_%_of_GDP else 
healthcare_spending_%_of_GDP_till_2009 
healthcare_spending_%_of_GDP_till_2009 = 0.09 
pc_healthcare_spending = total_healthcare_spending/Population.total_population 
private_healthcare_expenditure = total_healthcare_spending-
public_healthcare_expenditure 
public_healthcare_expenditure = total_healthcare_spending*public_source_% 
public_source_% = if (Taxation_System.labor_share>0) then 0.603 else 1 
total_healthcare_spending = 
Taxation_System.total_nominal_GDP*healthcare_spending_%_of_GDP_decision 
 
Pension System: 
Five_Years_Wages_per_Worker(t) = Five_Years_Wages_per_Worker(t - dt) + 
(sampling_input - sampling_output) * dt 
INIT Five_Years_Wages_per_Worker = 80000 
 TRANSIT TIME = varies 
 INFLOW LIMIT = ∞ 
 CAPACITY = ∞ 
INFLOWS: 
sampling_input = Taxation_System.nominal_wages_per_woker 
OUTFLOWS: 
sampling_output = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
 TRANSIT TIME = five_years_sampling_period 
Whole_Life_Wages_per_Worker(t) = Whole_Life_Wages_per_Worker(t - dt) + 
(sampling_input_2 - sampling_output_2) * dt 
INIT Whole_Life_Wages_per_Worker = 140000 
 TRANSIT TIME = varies 
 INFLOW LIMIT = ∞ 
 CAPACITY = ∞ 
INFLOWS: 
sampling_input_2 = Taxation_System.nominal_wages_per_woker 
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OUTFLOWS: 
sampling_output_2 = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
 TRANSIT TIME = whole_life_sampling_period 
annual_pension_payment = if (Taxation_System.labor_share>0) then 
pensioners*(pc_pensioner_payment/12*14) else 0 
five_years_sampling_period = 5 
pc_pensioner_payment = 
pension_base_decision*replacement_rate_decision*the_12_months_pension_decision 
pensioners = Population.Elderage_Population*pension_%_elderage 
pension_%_elderage = 0.6 
pension_base_decision = if (time>2010) and (sampling_policy_switch=1) then 
Whole_Life_Wages_per_Worker/whole_life_sampling_period else 
Five_Years_Wages_per_Worker/five_years_sampling_period 
replacement_rate = 0.6 
replacement_rate_decision = if(time>2010) and (replacement_rate_policy_switch=1) 
then replacement_rate else replacement_rate_till_2009 
replacement_rate_policy_switch = 0 
replacement_rate_till_2009 = 0.6 
sampling_policy_switch = 0 
the_12_months_pension = 12/12 
the_12_months_pension_decision = if(time>2010) and 
(the_12_months_pension_policy_switch=1) then the_12_months_pension else 
the_14_months_pension 
the_12_months_pension_policy_switch = 0 
the_14_months_pension = 14/12 
whole_life_sampling_period = 35 
 
Population: 
Elderage_Population(t) = Elderage_Population(t - dt) + (becoming_elderage + 
elderage_migration - elderage_death) * dt 
INIT Elderage_Population = 1.815E6 
INFLOWS: 
becoming_elderage = Workage_Population/workage_duration 
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elderage_migration = Elderage_Population*net_migration_rate 
OUTFLOWS: 
elderage_death = Elderage_Population/elderage_duration 
Workage_Population(t) = Workage_Population(t - dt) + (becoming_workage + 
workage_migration - becoming_elderage - workage_death) * dt 
INIT Workage_Population = 7.432E6 
INFLOWS: 
becoming_workage = Youth_Population/youth_duration 
workage_migration = Workage_Population*net_migration_rate 
OUTFLOWS: 
becoming_elderage = Workage_Population/workage_duration 
workage_death = Workage_Population*workage_death_rate 
Youth_Population(t) = Youth_Population(t - dt) + (youth_migration + birth - 
becoming_workage - youth_death) * dt 
INIT Youth_Population = 1.67E6 
INFLOWS: 
youth_migration = Youth_Population*net_migration_rate 
birth = women_in_fetile_age*total_fertility_rate/fertility_period 
OUTFLOWS: 
becoming_workage = Youth_Population/youth_duration 
youth_death = Youth_Population*youth_death_rate 
elderage_% = Elderage_Population/total_population*100 
fertility_period = 35 
total_population = Elderage_Population + Youth_Population + Workage_Population 
women_in_fetile_age = 
Workage_Population*proportion_of_fertile_age_women_in_workage_population 
workage_duration = 50 
youth_% = youth_population/total_population*100 
youth_duration = 15 
average_life_expectancy = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 78.0), (2002, 78.5), (2003, 78.7), (2004, 78.9), (2005, 79.1), (2006, 79.3), 
(2007, 79.6), (2008, 79.7), (2009, 79.7), (2010, 79.7), (2011, 79.9), (2012, 79.9), 
(2013, 79.9), (2014, 80.3), (2015, 80.6), (2016, 80.8), (2017, 80.8), (2018, 81.2), 
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(2019, 81.6), (2020, 81.9), (2021, 82.3), (2022, 82.7), (2023, 82.9), (2024, 83.3), 
(2025, 83.6), (2026, 84.2), (2027, 84.6), (2028, 85.4), (2029, 85.9), (2030, 87.0) 
elderage_duration = GRAPH(average_life_expectancy) 
(78.0, 13.0), (78.5, 13.5), (79.0, 14.0), (79.5, 14.5), (80.0, 15.0), (80.5, 15.5), (81.0, 
16.0), (81.5, 16.5), (82.0, 17.0), (82.5, 17.5), (83.0, 18.0), (83.5, 18.5), (84.0, 19.0), 
(84.5, 19.5), (85.0, 20.0), (85.5, 20.5), (86.0, 21.0), (86.5, 21.5), (87.0, 22.0) 
historic_population = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 1.1e+07), (2002, 1.1e+07), (2003, 1.1e+07), (2004, 1.1e+07), (2005, 1.1e+07), 
(2006, 1.1e+07), (2007, 1.1e+07), (2008, 1.1e+07), (2009, 1.1e+07), (2010, 1.1e+07) 
net_migration_rate = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 0.00266), (2002, 0.00347), (2003, 0.00346), (2004, 0.00327), (2005, 0.00371), 
(2006, 0.00351), (2007, 0.00359), (2008, 0.00357), (2009, 0.00357), (2010, 0.00357) 
proportion_of_fertile_age_women_in_workage_population = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 0.553), (2002, 0.549), (2003, 0.546), (2004, 0.539), (2005, 0.542), (2006, 
0.535), (2007, 0.528), (2008, 0.479), (2009, 0.465), (2010, 0.413) 
total_fertility_rate = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 1.27), (2002, 1.26), (2003, 1.27), (2004, 1.29), (2005, 1.31), (2006, 1.34), 
(2007, 1.40), (2008, 1.43), (2009, 1.46), (2010, 1.49), (2011, 1.46), (2012, 1.47), 
(2013, 1.47), (2014, 1.45), (2015, 1.45), (2016, 1.44), (2017, 1.44), (2018, 1.43), 
(2019, 1.43), (2020, 1.43), (2021, 1.43), (2022, 1.40), (2023, 1.40), (2024, 1.40), 
(2025, 1.39), (2026, 1.38), (2027, 1.37), (2028, 1.36), (2029, 1.35), (2030, 1.34) 
workage_death_rate = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 0.00055), (2002, 0.000575), (2003, 0.000575), (2004, 0.000525), (2005, 
0.00055), (2006, 0.000525), (2007, 0.00055), (2008, 0.00055), (2009, 0.000525), 
(2010, 0.0005) 
youth_death_rate = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 0.0058), (2002, 0.00571), (2003, 0.0058), (2004, 0.00562), (2005, 0.00508), 
(2006, 0.00499), (2007, 0.0049), (2008, 0.00481), (2009, 0.00477), (2010, 0.00472), 
(2011, 0.00436), (2012, 0.00432), (2013, 0.00405), (2014, 0.004), (2015, 0.00396), 
(2016, 0.00396), (2017, 0.00378), (2018, 0.00364), (2019, 0.00364), (2020, 0.0036), 
(2021, 0.0036), (2022, 0.00342), (2023, 0.00337), (2024, 0.00333), (2025, 0.00324), 
(2026, 0.00319), (2027, 0.00319), (2028, 0.00319), (2029, 0.00315), (2030, 0.00315) 
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Taxation System: 
Real_GDP(t) = Real_GDP(t - dt) + (real_GDP_change) * dt 
INIT Real_GDP = 136.281E9 
INFLOWS: 
real_GDP_change = Real_GDP*real_GDP_change_rate/100 
annual_income_tax = corporate_taxes+personal_taxes 
annual_social_contribution = 
corporate_social_contribution+personal_social_contribution 
black_economy = total_nominal_GDP-nominal_GDP 
black_economy_%_of_GDP = 0.25 
black_economy_%_of_GDP_decision = if (time>2010) and 
(tax_evasion_reduction_policy_swith=1) then black_economy_%_of_GDP else 
black_economy_%_of_GDP_till_2009 
black_economy_%_of_GDP_till_2009 = 0.25 
corporate_profits = max(0,total_nominal_GDP-nominal_wages) 
corporate_social_contribution = if (labor_share<1) then 
nominal_wages*corporate_social_contribution_rate_decision else 0 
corporate_social_contribution_rate = 0.15 
corporate_social_contribution_rate_decision = if(time>2010) and 
(taxation_system_policy_switch=1) then corporate_social_contribution_rate else 
corporate_social_contribution_rate_till_2009 
corporate_social_contribution_rate_till_2009 = 0.15 
corporate_taxes = corporate_profits*corporate_tax_rate_decision 
corporate_tax_rate = 0.24 
corporate_tax_rate_decision = if(time>2010) and (taxation_system_policy_switch=1) 
then corporate_tax_rate else corporate_tax_rate_till_2009 
corporate_tax_rate_till_2009 = 0.24 
employment = Population.Workage_Population*employment_rate 
employment_in_black_economy = total_employment-employment 
labor_share = 0.6 
nominal_GDP = Real_GDP*GDP_deflator/100 
nominal_wages = total_nominal_GDP*labor_share 
nominal_wages_per_woker = nominal_wages/total_employment 
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personal_social_contribution = 
nominal_wages*personal_social_contribution_rate_decision 
personal_social_contribution_rate = 0.11 
personal_social_contribution_rate_decision = if(time>2010) and 
(taxation_system_policy_switch=1) then personal_social_contribution_rate else 
personal_social_contribution_rate_till_2009 
personal_social_contribution_rate_till_2009 = 0.11 
personal_taxes = nominal_wages*personal_tax_rate_decision 
personal_tax_rate = 0.24 
personal_tax_rate_decision = if(time>2010) and (taxation_system_policy_switch=1) 
then personal_tax_rate else personal_tax_rate_till_2009 
personal_tax_rate_till_2009 = 0.24 
taxation_system_policy_switch = 0 
tax_evasion_reduction_policy_swith = 0 
total_employment = employment*(1.25-black_economy_%_of_GDP_decision) 
total_nominal_GDP = nominal_GDP*(1.25-black_economy_%_of_GDP_decision) 
employment_rate = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 0.565), (2002, 0.563), (2003, 0.575), (2004, 0.587), (2005, 0.594), (2006, 
0.601), (2007, 0.61), (2008, 0.614), (2009, 0.619), (2010, 0.612), (2011, 0.596) 
GDP_deflator = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 100), (2002, 103), (2003, 107), (2004, 111), (2005, 114), (2006, 120), (2007, 
117), (2008, 127), (2009, 129), (2010, 132), (2011, 135), (2012, 139), (2013, 140), 
(2014, 144), (2015, 148), (2016, 150), (2017, 153), (2018, 157), (2019, 162), (2020, 
166), (2021, 170), (2022, 175), (2023, 179), (2024, 183), (2025, 188), (2026, 192), 
(2027, 197), (2028, 200), (2029, 206), (2030, 212) 
real_GDP_change_rate = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2001, 4.20), (2002, 3.44), (2003, 5.94), (2004, 4.62), (2005, 2.24), (2006, 4.90), 
(2007, 0.00), (2008, 8.10), (2009, -2.50), (2010, -3.97), (2011, -4.50), (2012, -3.00), 
(2013, 1.00), (2014, 4.00), (2015, 4.00), (2016, 4.00), (2017, 4.00), (2018, 4.00), 
(2019, 4.00), (2020, 4.00), (2021, 4.00), (2022, 4.00), (2023, 4.00), (2024, 4.00), 
(2025, 4.00), (2026, 4.00), (2027, 4.00), (2028, 4.00), (2029, 3.90), (2030, 3.90) 
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